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Abstract: There are ongoing divisions in the learning sciences between perspectives that treat 
cognition as occurring within individual minds and those that treat it as irreducibly distributed or 
situated in material and social contexts. We contend that accounts of individual minds as complex 
systems are theoretically continuous with distributed and situated cognition.  On this view, the 
difference is a matter of the scale of the dynamics of interest, and the choice of scale can be 
informed by data.  In this paper, we propose heuristics for empirically determining the scale of the 
relevant cognitive dynamics.  We illustrate these heuristics in two contrasting cases, one in which 
the evidence supports attributing cognition to a group of students and one in which the evidence 
supports attributing cognition to an individual.  
Introduction 
Researchers have been divided on how to answer the question ―Where is the mind?‖ (Cobb, 1994)  The ―cognitivist‖ 
perspective takes the individual as the unit of theoretical and empirical focus, under the assumption that cognition is 
something that only brains do.  While cognitivists do not ignore the social and material contexts in which cognition 
takes place, they analyze cognition by decomposing it into the information processing of individuals (Anderson, 
Reder, & Simon, 1997). That stance contrasts with situated and distributed views, which contend that cognitive 
processes cannot be neatly attributed to contributions of individuals when they interact with each other and their 
environment.  Arguments for situated cognition often cite the example of a dieter solving the problem of taking three 
quarters of half a cup of cottage cheese by pouring out half a cup of cottage cheese, cutting it into fours, and 
removing one quarter (Lave, Murtaugh, & De La Rocha, 1984). A paradigmatic example of distributed cognition 
describes the information processing within an airplane cockpit  to show that it is the cockpit as a whole—the people 
and instruments together as a unit—that ―remembers‖ the safe landing speed of the airplane (Hutchins, 1995). Each 
challenges the attribution of cognition to an individual mind by arguing that cognition is irreducibly situated in a 
material and social context.  The dieter‘s knowledge of finding ¾ of ½ a cup is inseparable from the physical 
materials they use to solve the problem.  Likewise, no one part of the cockpit ―knows‖ the ever-changing safe 
landing speed of the airplane.   
There have been a number of arguments regarding the relationship between these perspectives.  Cobb 
(1994) took them to be complementary, with one in the background of the other; Sfard (1998) also considered them 
complementary but ―incommensurable‖; Greeno (1997) took them as competing alternatives.  In this article, we 
review an argument for theoretical continuity among these perspectives, by which they represent different scales of a 
complex system, rather than as fundamentally different approaches.  Rather than consider the choice of perspective a 
matter of a priori theoretical commitments, we propose treating that choice as empirical.  We offer heuristics for 
matching the choice of unit of analysis to the dynamics evident in the data, arguing that the cognitive unit can be 
modeled at the grain size(s) at which there are observable stabilities and coherent dynamics in cognitive activity. We 
then illustrate the use of these heuristics with two example analyses demonstrating empirical evidence for group and 
individual cognitive units, respectively.   
Manifold resources 
Minsky‘s (1988) is probably the most widely known account of mind as comprised of manifold cognitive and 
metacognitive parts.  He described a ―society of mind‖ made up of a very large number of ―agents.‖  One agent he 
proposed was More.  When More was active it was comparing two amounts and deciding which was greater.  More 
was a society itself, made up of agents that corresponded to different ways of comparing different sorts of amounts, 
and the agents that made up more were made up of other agents.  The model presented a complex system of 
interactions and structures at a wide range of scales.  That work influenced many others‘ accounts, including 
diSessa‘s ―knowledge in pieces‖ (1988) and Dennett‘s (1991) multiple drafts model of consciousness; it resembles 
and may have been influenced by ―schemas‖ (Rumelhart, 1980).        
We refer to ―resources‖ as a generic term for the parts in such models of mind (Hammer, Elby, Scherr, & 
Redish, 2005).  On this view, what we experience as ―states of mind‖ correspond to stable patterns of resource 
activations, stability that might be only local and contextual or over extended timescales; a stable pattern of resource 
activations may become a resource in itself, much like Minsky‘s More.  But a stable pattern of activated fine-grained 
cognitive elements is not necessarily constrained to an individual mind: the pattern and its stability might extend 
over multiple individuals and artifacts.  In this sense, the unit of ―cognition‖ – the pattern of resources and its 
stability – might at times be individual or be distributed.  Our claim is that empirical determination of the extent and 
locus of stability of such cognitive coherence should guide our sense of the unit of cognition, not a priori theoretical 
commitments.  
Consistent with the views of cognition as situated and distributed, there are behaviors and cognitive 
dynamics that can emerge out of the interaction of multiple individuals and artifacts.  Great strides have been made 
in the last quarter century in modeling how complex behaviors can emerge from interacting agents following 
surprisingly simple sets of rules.  Paradigmatic examples include flocking birds (Kennedy & Eberhart, 1995), 
synchronized flashes of fireflies (Mirollo & Strogatz, 1990), and foraging of ant colonies (Dorigo & Stützle, 2004).  
Thelen and Smith (1994; Smith, 2005) have argued for complex systems-based models of cognitive development in 
individuals, again taking a mind to be made up of many interacting parts in dynamic interaction with each other.   
Meanwhile, social science has advanced a variety of accounts of interactive dynamics, such as in 
conversations tending to abide by simple rules (Grice, 1989) and in shared interpretive frameworks (Goffman, 1974) 
that are maintained explicitly and implicitly by attending to and responding to verbal, facial and behavioral 
metamessages (Bateson, 1985; Tannen, 1993).  These too may be understood as complex systems, at this larger 
scale.  We suggest that these can be seen as similar dynamics at different scales, that a ―society of mind‖ model of 
individual cognition is theoretical continuous with a ―mind of society‖ model of social cognition. Thus one can 
model the dynamics of cognition via the synchronized activity of many cognitive resources, whether those resources 
are within an individual mind or distributed across minds and materials.    
What to look for: Heuristics for Data-Based Choice of Unit of Cognition 
On this view, rather than as a priori commitment, the scale of the relevant dynamics may be determined by the 
evidence at hand.  Our core purpose here is to propose four heuristics for making that determination: clustering, 
persistence, resistance, and transition.  We extracted these from a range of recent work dealing with a variety of 
dynamics relevant to cognition including conceptions, behaviors, framing, and epistemologies (Conlin, Gupta, 
Scherr, & Hammer; Frank, Kanim, & Gomez, 2008; Scherr & Hammer, 2009).  The heuristics are not a coding 
scheme, but rather a guide for empirically grounding the choice of the unit of analysis.  In what follows we describe 
the heuristics and then apply them to two specific examples to show how they can do work in finding an appropriate 
unit of analysis for modeling cognition.  
Clustering  
The basic idea of clustering is that a coherent cognitive state can be characterized by the ‗hanging together‘ or 
simultaneous activation of multiple elements in the same domain or across domains.  For example, how we 
recognize someone as greeting us is by the clustering of behavioral and speech patterns such as a hand extended for 
hand-shake, a smile on the face, an elevated vocal pitch, and the utterance of socially-accepted greeting words such 
as ―Hello.‖  Together, these behaviors help us interpret the activity as a ―greeting.‖  Scherr & Hammer (2009) found 
clusters of various kinds of behaviors (e.g., facial expressions, gestures, pitch, posture) that tended to occur 
synchronously within and across students working on physics worksheets in groups of four. 
Persistence  
If clusters are to be suggestive of cognitive stabilities then they need to be more than just fleeting happenstance; they 
should persist over time.  In the case of a hand-shake the behaviors might persist for a few seconds, while in other 
cases clusters could remain stable over much larger time scale.  For example, while watching a thriller movie, 
behaviors such as stiff posture, intense gaze on the screen, and low perceptivity of the environment could form a 
cluster that persists over several minutes.  In (Scherr & Hammer, 2009) stable clusters of behaviors were found to 
last from as little as a few seconds up to several uninterrupted minutes.  
Resistance to Change 
In general, the stability of the state of a system is inferred in its ability to sustain itself in the face of perturbations.   
In certain moments, minor changes in the makeup of the cluster (whether the unit is the individual or the group) 
could challenge the coherence of physical and cognitive activity.  Still, the clusters characterizing the cognitive 
coherence may be so stable that they can persist despite the perturbation/disturbance.  Think of a greeting that lacks 
an important element, say, when one person extends a hand but the other person does not shake it.  This can be a 
palpable challenge to the ―greeting‖ frame, but it does not always result in a breakdown of the rest of the greeting 
activities. Fine-grained analysis of the phenomenon can illuminate how particular clusters react to naturally 
occurring perturbations, providing evidence on the stability and transition dynamics of clusters.  More importantly, 
such analysis can provide empirical insight into whether the cluster (of resources, behaviors, etc.) in that moment is 
stabilized by an individual or a group. 
Transitions 
Sudden transitions in behavior help mark the spatial and temporal boundaries of the stabilities.  If there are multiple 
stable states in the cognitive dynamics of an individual or a group, then we should be able to see distinct transitions 
amongst the stable states.  For this reason it is often easier to notice changes in clusters than to notice the stable 
clusters themselves—when something suddenly changes it highlights what was just a local stability.  When a 
greeting is over, all of the behaviors that are characteristic of greetings end at about the same time, possibly turning 
into another cluster corresponding to, say, a conversation.   
For an empirical example, the behavioral clusters of Scherr and Hammer (2009) were found only after 
noticing distinct transitions in behavior.  That there were noticeable transitions led the researchers to find and clarify 
what the transitions were from and to, which upon further analysis were found to be coherent clusters of behaviors.  
The behavioral transitions are easily and reliably identified: before discussion three independent coders agreed on 
the timing of 90% behavioral transitions (to within five seconds).  Transitions are often the result of ―bids‖, i.e. 
minor changes in the clusters of behaviors.  Bids that do not precipitate a transition to a new behavior cluster are 
evidence of the stability of the cluster.  Bids that lead to a marked transition between stable clusters are also 
evidence of the coherence of those clusters. 
    In the examples that follow we will report on the clustering, resistance, and transitions of phenomena at the 
individual level and at the group level.  We attend to the students‘ physical behavior (gesture, gaze, posture, etc.) as 
well as the substance of their discourse in applying these heuristics. 
Data Analysis 
Our data is from an introductory algebra-based introductory physics course at a large public university.  The 
students are mostly third-year life sciences majors.  We draw our observations from video taken during tutorial 
sessions – 50-minute sessions, facilitated by teaching assistants, in which the students work in groups of four on 
ungraded guided-inquiry worksheets focusing on conceptual and epistemological development in physics. 
 First, we present an example of group-level dynamics in behavior and epistemological framing, that is a 
sense of ―what is it that is going on here‖ with respect to knowledge (Hammer, et al, 2005).  In the process we will 
show how the evidence of clustering, persistence over time, resistance to change, and spontaneous transitions all 
support this account in terms of group-level stabilities and dynamics.  We then present a second example that 
supports an individual unit of analysis but not group-level cognition, in order to show a contrasting case of the scale 
of the unit of analysis.  
More typically, we expect, the relevant scale may shift over the course of an episode, and we expect that 
analyzing those dynamics will be a fruitful direction for further analyses.  For the present, we focus on articulating 
heuristics for identifying the scale of the dynamics, and for that purpose we have chosen ―cleaner‖ examples.    
The Group as a Unit of Analysis 
The first example
i
 comes from a Newton‘s Third Law tutorial, where four students (Amanda, Bridget, Camille, and 
Dianna) are working together on a series of worksheet questions about a collision between a truck and a car.    The 
particular question they are considering during this clip asks: ―Suppose the truck‘s mass is 2000 kg while the car‘s 
mass is 1000 kg.  And suppose the truck slows down by 5 m/s during the collision.  Intuitively, how much speed 
does the car gain during the collision?‖  Camille is the first to offer a response, asking whether the car gains 5 m/s 
since the truck slows down by 5 m/s.  This is an excerpt from the ensuing discussion: 
 
1 Amanda: The car is half as heavy, so it'll gain twice as much 
2 Camille: Ah, shoot (laughs) 
3 Dianna: Or something, Idunno. 
4 Amanda: That's what they want us to think, but this is not the real answer 
5 Bridget: This is not the right /one/.  Apparently, I think that's what they want us 
to say. 
 
…about ten seconds of silence… 
 
6 Dianna:  This is going...five...five meters per second, that's it‘s what? 
Acceleration or velocity? 
7 Camille: Speed.  Velocity 
8 Amanda: (together with Camille) velocity. 
9 Bridget: Slows down by...?? 
10 Dianna:  Velocity? 
11 Camille: Mm hmm. (pause) So the car gains ten meters per second? 
12 Bridget: I guess. 
13 Dianna: Didn't he say something about how like...something in class, like...if 
something's touched, the velocity, or something was changed...what was 
he talking about in class?  Something? 
 
…about ten seconds of silence… 
 
 
Camille‘s first intuition differed from Amanda‘s and Bridget‘s. Camille says, ―the truck slows down by 5 
m/s, the car speeds up by 5 m/s‖ but Amanda says that it would be 10 m/s because ―the car is half as heavy.‖  The 
discussion, however, quickly dies out and the students continue to engage in the school routine of completing the 
worksheet (writing best-guess answers, and occasionally seeking confirmation of vocabulary terms), until Dianna 
overhears the word ―intuitively‖ from a different group‘s conversation, and expresses her own frustration:  
 
14 Dianna: I hate that word, ―intuitively.‖ 
15 Camille: See intuitively, I would think that it'd slow down, I mean speed up 
five meters per second. 
16 Bridget: Isn't the car...do they mean /once they hit/? 
17 Amanda: Because it is slowing down. 
18 Camille: If the if the truck if the truck if the truck, suppose the truck slows 
down by five meters in the collision, so if the truck is slowing 
down, then /I guess/ the car has to be speeding up. 
19 Dianna: The car's not moving 
20 Amanda: Yeah, it's not moving 
21 Bridget: But I think...does that mean- 
22 Camille: No, but I'm saying it says how much does does the car gain, cause 
it, yeah... 
23 Bridget: cause like it goes psh (gestures collision with hands) 
 
A vigorous discussion follows Dianne‘s statement as the students now focus on their own reasoning, not 
the worksheet; their voices and behaviors are animated as they try to communicate their ideas with gestures and 
explanations; and they pose original questions, such as what if the car and truck were equally heavy (not shown in 
transcript). During this strip of discourse, they clarify the details of the collision and the resulting speeds. 
 In what follows, we apply our heuristics to empirical observation of the students‘ behaviors and reasoning 
in these two segments to argue for the group, rather than individual students as the unit that determines the stability 
and dynamics of the behavioral and reasoning patterns. 
Clustering of Behavior and Reasoning: Group as Unit 
As students go through the tutorial, multiple elements of their behaviors – gaze, body posture, extent of gestures, 
and tone of voice – are coordinated or clustered in particular patterns.   Scherr and Hammer (2009) identified four 
stable clusters of behaviors exhibited by groups in tutorial, and  these clusters account for most of the groups‘ time 
spent in tutorial (Conlin, Gupta, R. E Scherr, & D. Hammer, 2007)  We will only mention the two clusters that are 
relevant here, blue and green. 
(a)  (b)  
 Figure 1. (a) The students exhibiting the "blue" cluster of behaviors, and (b) the 
students exhibiting the "green" cluster. 
 
In the first segment of the episode, the group is exhibiting the blue behavioral cluster (see Figure 1a) -characterized 
by downward gaze, hands writing or resting on the table, scant and mostly deictic gesturing, low or flat voices, and 
intermittent speech with no overlap.  In the second segment, the students transition as a group to the green 
behavioral cluster (Figure1b), in which they tend to make eye contact, sit up, gesture, and speak in animated voices 
with overlapping speech.  The arrows in Figure 1 show how the gaze of the students is coordinated – and the locus 
of their gaze shifts in synchronous patterns making it meaningful to talk about the group as gazing towards the 
worksheet during the earlier segment and towards one another during the second segment.   
These behavioral clusters also often indicate locally stable ways in which the students were framing the 
activity, either as completing the worksheet or as having a discussion (Scherr & Hammer, 2009).  At first, their 
speech is in the service of finding the answer to the worksheet question.  Amanda, Dianne, and Bridget all but say 
this explicitly by suggesting that Camille write down an answer that ―they want us to think‖ rather than one that 
makes sense to her.  Furthermore, their answers are brief and only weakly supported with justification.  Dianna tries 
to settle the vocabulary (―five meters per second, that‘s its what, acceleration or velocity?‖) and tries to remember 
the information the professor gave in class about collisions.  The content of their speech taken in conjunction with 
their behaviors suggests that the group is initially framing the activity as completing the worksheet.  After Dianna 
expresses her frustration with the word ―intuitively,‖ the group starts to clarify and piece together the mechanism of 
what happens during a collision, rather than simply comparing the speed before and after.  Their speech and 
behaviors are clustered around having a discussion about a physical phenomenon: Bridget, Amanda, and Dianne try 
to clarify the conditions of the collision; Camille reasons about the reactions of the truck and car as related, ―if the 
truck is slowing down, then /I guess/ the car has to be speeding up‖ (emphasis added); Bridget‘s gestures try to 
simulate the motion of the car.  
Transition in Behavior and Reasoning: Group as Unit 
There is a sharp transition in behavior at both the individual and the group levels that starts with Dianna‘s 
commentary that she ―hates that word, ‗intuitively.‘‖  Her affective stance shook the group away from the 
worksheet, opening up the space for a more personal discussion.  Everyone looks up to pay attention to Dianna – a 
sharing among friends.  To Camille, this provided the space to clarify her original intuition, an action she did not 
take in the first part of the episode when the focus was on figuring out what ―they want us to think.‖ Camille‘s 
emphasis on the word ‗intuitively‘ and tone support this interpretation. Next, Camille emphasizes the compensation 
of speeds between the truck and the car; Amanda gestures the speeding up of the car after the collision.  The 
emotional outburst of Dianna cued them to think about and communicate their personal opinions, leading to a 
cascade of utterances towards mechanistic pursuit of the phenomenon.  The coordinated nature of the transition in 
behavior (from blue cluster to the green cluster) and framing (from doing the worksheet to having a discussion) 
makes it appropriate to think about the group as transitioning rather than four individuals separately making these 
transitions.  This supports the theoretical coupling of framing and behavior, since behaviors act as the metamessages 
that comprise and maintain the group‘s framing (Bateson, 1985). 
 
Resistance of Behavior and Reasoning: Group as Unit 
Bids to switch frames – instances in which one students‘ behaviors and/or reasoning stand in contrast to that of the 
established coherent frame (Scherr & Hammer, 2009) – can provide valuable insight into the dynamics and 
appropriate scale for a cognitive unit.  In this episode, while the group is exhibiting the blue behavioral cluster 
engaged in completing the worksheet, Dianna makes a bid to have a discussion (turn 13).  This is evident through 
her behavior, since she sits up, speaks more loudly, and has much more pronounced prosody when asking, ―Didn't 
they say something about how like...what was he talking about in class?‖  One by one, the other students briefly 
look up as she is talking.  As she trails off, however, the other students return to their blue cluster behaviors one by 
one.  There is no talking for 10 seconds as the group goes back to completing the worksheet.  Dianna‘s bid to change 
behaviors was not taken up.   
Epistemologically, Dianna‘s question is a bid to try to remember what the professor said in class, a 
departure from the group‘s engagement in finding the worksheet-directed intuitive answer to the gain in the car‘s 
speed.  That the rest of the group simply turns back down to their worksheets without responding to her question 
sends the message that they did not see this as a productive line of pursuit.  Dianne‘s deviation from the shared 
cluster of behaviors and framing could not disrupt it, rather it was Dianne who returned to that shared activity. This 
illustrates the stability of the cluster and its extension beyond single individuals.  
Persistence of Behavior and Reasoning: Group as Unit 
Additional evidence for the group being the appropriate unit of analysis here comes from examining what keeps the 
behavior or framing stable during these segments.  We find that the behaviors serving as meta-messages 
communicating the fine-grained stances students are taking in their utterances.  When a student makes animated 
gestures or talks loudly, it sends the message of a discussion or argument in contrast to hunching over your personal 
worksheet.  Seeing one member clarifying an idea might prompt a second student to add to it, which supports and 
encourages the effort of the first creating feedback loops that help in the persistence of the activity.  The moment-to-
moment behaviors and utterances establish a shared understanding of the nature of the activity – that is self-
sustaining.  Before the transition, individual behaviors such as hunching over the worksheet, exchanging short 
vocabulary or quick questions in low voices, reinforces the group’s shared sense of the activity of filling the 
worksheet; and later, after the transition, their pursuit of a mechanistic explanation of what happens in the collision 
is built out of bits of contribution from the different members.  In either segment, the persistence of behaviors and 
reasoning is a group endeavor, even though individuals are enacting these behaviors and utterances. 
The Individual as a Unit of Analysis 
The second example
ii
 comes from a tutorial on shadows and light.  In this tutorial, students try to build a model of 
light by exploring the patterns and motions of light created by a light bulb and an aperture.   The question being 
considered by the group during the clip is, ―Why does the light on the screen moves to the left when the bulb is 
moved to the right?‖  Veronica and Jan have a disagreement over the mechanism of light shining through the 
aperture.  Here is a piece of the conversation: 
 
Jan: All the rays are going like this.  So, it's kind of like polarizing it. 
Veronica: Mmm, not really. 
Jan: You sure? 
Veronica: It's just, well, it's just, guys, you're making it- you‘re trying to 
make it too difficult.  It's just, the light goes out.  It only goes 
through that one circle.  So, obviously, if it is down here, and 
I'm looking through that circle. Look, you're sitting down here. 
You're looking at this big cardboard.  You're looking up through 
that little circle.  All you're going to see is what's up there. It‘s a 
direct line. 
Jan: Look, I see what you are saying, alright?  But, I'm just trying to 
make it like physics-, physics-oriented. 
Veronica: It is physics-oriented, that's just the way it is. 
Jan: Okay. 
 
Clustering of Behavior and Reasoning: Individuals as Unit 
Throughout the conversation presented as well as before and after it, Veronica is sitting up, looking at the other 
group members, speaking in a loud, animated tone, and gesturing (Fig 2).  Jan, who is sitting across the table from 
Veronica, for large parts of the tutorial, is hunched over, and drawing on the tutorial worksheet.  During the 
moments of the conversation above, she does look up at Veronica and speak in a clear and loud voice, but these 
were fleeting moments.  The larger pattern was of students conducting themselves differently. This lack of 
synchronicity and coordination among the behaviors suggests a clustering at the individual level in this case, not at 
the group level. 
 
 
Figure 2. Veronica is gesturing as Jan is writing on her worksheet. 
 
Again, the contrasting behaviors indicate that Jan and Veronica are framing the activity differently, also 
evidenced by their very different epistemological stances.  Veronica is appealing to her intuitive sense of mechanism 
of how light travels, while Jan tries to make what Veronica is saying more ―physics-oriented,‖ by using technical 
terminology.  Veronica objects with a different take on what it means to be physics-oriented, namely that it is ―just 
the way it is.‖  For Veronica, the activity is about making sense, while Jan is trying to get the formal answer.   
Persistence and Resistance of Behaviors and Reasoning: Individuals as Unit 
Both Veronica and Jan activate a stable set of epistemological resources throughout this clip.  In fact, this stability 
persists on much larger timescales than one tutorial period.  Lising & Elby (2005) analyze Jan‘s work throughout the 
course and argue that her epistemological stance, in which there is a barrier between formal and everyday reasoning, 
is relatively stable and robust throughout the semester.   
 The persistence of each student in their epistemological framing is stable in spite of direct challenges from 
each other.  Veronica expresses impatience with Jan by bluntly correcting her with, ―Mmmm, not really.‖  She 
criticizes Jan for ―trying to make it to difficult,‖ and proceeds to explain the phenomenon with common-sense 
reasoning.  Jan contents that she is just trying to make it ―physics-oriented,‖ with the implication that Veronica‘s 
common-sense explanation is not physics-oriented.  Veronica defends herself from this challenge: ―It is physics-
oriented.  It‘s just the way it is.‖  When Jan responds with, ―Okay,‖ the group goes silent.  It appears that they just 
agree to disagree, persisting in their epistemological framing despite the explicit bids made to change them. 
Transition in Behaviors and Reasoning: Individuals as Unit 
Just as there is no coherent clustering at the group level, there are no clear transitions at the group level between 
clusters.  This seems to be the exception rather than the norm, since most of the time groups spend in tutorial is in 
one of four behavioral clusters separated by sharp transitions (Scherr & Hammer, 2009).  This counts as evidence 
against the group being the unit of cognitive analysis during this clip.  This lack of group transitions, taken in 
conjunction with the other heuristics above, constitutes a strong empirical case for taking the individual as the unit 
of analysis here. 
Conclusions 
Our argument is two-tiered.  On one tier, we analyze the behavior and discourse within two episodes of student 
group work in introductory physics tutorials.  We found evidence for stabilities and dynamics of cognition at the 
group level and the individual level, using four empirical heuristics for identifying the scale of the cognitive unit.   
In the first example we demonstrated that the clustering, persistence, resistance, and transition reflect dynamics at 
the level of the group as a whole.  It is the collective group frame that enables them to reason about the mechanisms 
involved in a collision in a more sophisticated way.  In the second example we demonstrated how clustering, 
persistence, and resistance resided not with the group but rather on the level of individual students‘ epistemological 
stances and their conceptual understanding of how light travels.  Veronica and Jan held different views not only of 
light but also of physics, and these views remained stable in the face of their mutual bids to change the other‘s mind. 
One tier up, we are arguing that these analyses demonstrate how the choice of cognitive unit can be made 
empirically by attending to the dynamics and stabilities evident in the data.  This is in contrast to the positions on 
both sides of the ongoing debate about the unit of analysis, with cognitivist and situativists basing their decision 
largely on theoretical considerations.  We introduced four empirical heuristics for identifying the scale of cognitive 
dynamics.  Our analyses of the two episodes highlight the utility and generativity of our empirical heuristics, 
although we do no claim that these span the set of evidentiary supports for determining the cognitive unit.  All of 
this is underwritten by the resources and framing model of mind, since resources can be distributed within an 
individual mind or across several individuals and artifacts.  Hopefully our approach will enable greater 
communication and collaboration between cognitivists and those who model cognition as situated and/or distributed. 
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i
 The Newton‘s 3rd law clip is also discussed in Scherr & Hammer (2009).   
ii
 The Shadows and Light clip is also discussed in (Lising & Elby, 2005). 
